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1 There is no easy way to defeat Kant’s first Critique: Kant is indefatigable in rescuing his
apparent lapses by means of overriding second thoughts and ingenuities. Nevertheless,
he  makes  no  sustained  attempt  to  provide  any  evidentiary  confirmation  of  his
strongest  claims  in  favor  of  necessary  truths  about  exceptionless  universal  laws  of
nature and principles of Reason regarding the supposed cognitive fixities of the natural
world: for instance in supplying an abundance of necessary synthetic a priori truths,
apodictic judgments and the like. The fact is, there is more than prima facie evidence
that all of Kant’s specimens of such would-be truths (largely drawn from his reading of
Newton’s  physics,  as  in  the  B  Introduction  to  the  first  Critique)  fail  outright.  They
appear  to  be  completely  arbitrary;  that’s  to  say,  true  only  by  “stipulative”  fiat  a
posteriori (as C.I. Lewis affirms), or else they reduce harmlessly to analytic truths (see
Lewis 1970). I leave all that aside as a provisional stalemate that may invite a stronger
defense of realism than Kant’s, if one can be found. If there is such an argument, it’s
likely to have been ignored by Rationalists. It would have had to reveal a substantial
lapse  on  Kant’s  part  that  Kant’s  own doctrine  could  never  recover  convincingly:  a
conceptual option Kant’s theory effectively precludes.
2 Now, I  think there is such an option which standard empiricisms are aware of,  but
rarely draw on. Let me then offer some familiar philosophical ground – conceded by
Kant – that invites the strategy I have in mind. There’s little point in challenging Kant
on merely textual or internal grounds: we require an entirely independent theory that,
at  its  best,  exposes  the  argumentative  gap  suggested.  In  that  sense,  the  maneuver
should be a simple matter. I find a particularly instructive clue in the Darwinian and
neo-Darwinian continuum linking the higher mammals and the human primate. For, if
these  languageless  creatures  are  actually  intelligent  –  learning  from  experience,
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solving problems requiring a palpable measure of “reasoning,” not to be confused with
Kant’s invention of Vernunft, the “faculty of Reason” (or “Rational cognition”) – and if
Vernunft entails  a  mastery  of  language,  then,  for  one  thing,  there  must  be  a
“functionality”  of  mind  that  is  a  form  of  “thinking”  or  “reasoning”  accessible  to
animals  and  maturing  human  infants  (as  well  as  adult  human  primates)  that
spontaneously qualifies the sensory sources of perceptual and experiential cognition,
without  any  input  from  Vernunft;  and,  for  another,  the  empirical  component  of
cognition cannot be merely passive, must be cognitively adequate and effective in some
degree  due to  the  apt  “functionality”  of  mind,  that  we may reasonably  identify  as
“animal  reasoning”  (or  thinking).  I  should  add  that  I  regard  the  contest  between
pragmatism  and  Kant’s  transcendentalism  –  addressed  to  the  question-begging
(cognitive) issues of First Philosophy – to count among the most telling confrontations
of contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless, neither Kant’s Vernunft (Reason: the would-
be faculty of cognition, said to be addressed, transcendentally, to “what there is” in the
actual world), nor the serviceable functionalities of animal “reasoning” (or thinking) are
demonstrably  designed  to  determine  the  validity  of  realist  (unlanguaged)  claims.
Ultimately, the key issues of First Philosophy (epistemological or ontological) must be
treated as no more than plausible conjectures,  conditionally dependent on our best
guesses regarding the would-be conduits to reality. But of course, that’s to say that
philosophy can never be satisfactorily completed. 
3 Kant begins the B Introduction to the first Critique very nearly as an empiricist, but he
overtakes the seeming initial autonomy of sensory experience at once by permitting
experience to count as an admissible form of realist cognition only if (and where) it is
constrained by the independent cognitive powers Kant assigns the faculty of Reason
(Vernunft),  that  spontaneously  provide  objective  and  objectual  form  to  (otherwise)
passively streaming “sensible impressions.” I shall depend largely on the thrust of the
following two passages from the first Critique: one from the B Introduction; the other
from the section titled, “On the [Transcendental] Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding” – that’s to say, categories of Reason (Vernunft) that must be in play
before any pertinent sensory episode occurs. I take both passages to be self-defeating.
The first is altogether too vague to be trusted: 
There  is  no  doubt  whatever,  [Kant  begins]  that  all  our  cognition  begins  with
experience […]. But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it
does not on that account all arise from experience. For it could well be that even
our  experiential  cognition  is  a  composite  of  that  which  we  receive  through
impressions  and  that  which  our  own  cognitive  faculty  (merely  prompted  by
sensible impressions) provides out of itself, which addition we cannot distinguish
from that fundamental material until long practice has made us attentive to it […].
(B1-2)
4 But, of course, this fails utterly to explain how the entire table of discursive categories is
originally  supplied  –  say,  to  infant  primates,  who  are  about  to  learn  their  home
language. It seems as if they must begin with sensory concepts that exhibit a suitable
affinity with the discursive concepts they eventually master.  Which is  to say,  there
must be a functional form of “reasoning” or “thinking” accessible to advanced animal
species as well as human infants, if we are to account for the infants’ normal feat – a
feat altogether different from the work of Vernunft (Reason), putatively the facultative
power of discursive cognition. At the very least, the initial sensory streaming cannot be
entirely  passive.  On  the  contrary,  Vernunft itself  seems  to  depend  on  forms  of
elementary  “reasoning”  (inference,  for  instance)  that  is  already  inseparable  from
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experientially  grounded animal  intelligence.  I  take this  to  be an essential  lesson of
Darwinian and post-Darwinian evolution. In any event, in their very different ways,
both Darwin and Kant scant the same question. 
5 The second passage reads as follows:
Now we already have two sorts of concepts of an entirely different kind, which yet
agree with each other in that they both relate objects completely a priori, namely
the  concepts  of  space  and  time,  as  forms  of  sensibility,  and  the  categories,  as
concepts of the understanding. (B117/A85)
6 I cannot see why Kant supposed his choice of a priori necessity was more compelling
than  a  robust  form  of  contingent  empirical  cognition  suitably  fitted  to  animal
intelligence,  without  any  need  for  discursive  concepts.  (What,  for  instance,  is  the
meaning of “prompted” in the first passage?)
7 Here’s  a  first  consideration.  If  the  original  streaming  of  “sensible  impressions”  is
essentially formless, apart from the forms provided by space and time, then, given the
continuum of animal and human perception and experience offered (say) in Darwinian
and post-Darwinian evolution, some sort of transcendental apriorism may have to be
conceded to function realistically among languageless animals; and if that’s refused,
(say) on the grounds that any pertinent a priori presupposes a mastery of language and
the use of discursive concepts, then there simply are no intelligent animals to be found.
But that’s preposterous. I agree with the drift of evolutionism (and Aristotle) to the
effect that there must be perceptual concepts distinct from discursive concepts (though
suitably akin to the latter),  if  we are to concede that human infants begin to grasp
objectual  structures  before  they  have  actually  mastered  a  workable  language.  I’m
inclined to  think that  spatial  and temporal  structures  tend to  be  inseparable  from
standard perceptual distinctions that include but are not restricted to anything like
perceptible macroscopic objects. The archic powers (of the would-be cognitive faculty,
Vernunft) are simply circularly “deduced.” 
8 This suggests a second, more searching consideration. If there are intelligent animals
capable of realist  discrimination – despite lacking language and discursive concepts
(bears fishing for salmon, say) – then there must be an enabling form of “reasoning”
(capable  of  a  range  of  inference,  for  instance  solving  problems,  learning  from
experience)  that  standardly  accompanies  empirical  cognition  without  requiring
transcendental powers of any kind – that nonetheless extends to perceptual space and
time (not merely geometric) – then Kant is defeated by the facts of animal life. Just
think of a housecat learning to unlatch a kitchen cabinet or a border collie rounding up
stray  sheep.  Kant  introduces  Reason  (Vernunft) as  the  executive  (transcendental)
“faculty of  cognition”  possessed  exclusively  by  enlanguaged selves.  Kant  makes  the
double assumption that the separate, completely independent contributions of Reason
(or  thought)  and  passively  received  “sensory  impressions”  (or  sensibility)  must,
somehow, mesh correctly if  it  is to yield empirical cognition; and that, at the same
time, Vernunft must already possess the requisite concepts and categories before and
entirely independently of  the sensory event itself.  But I  cannot see how that could
possibly work, if Reason were unable to construct its objectual concepts by abstracting
pertinent sensory features from the independent sensory manifold. Of course, in that
case, the transcendental would (as I say) depend on the sensory itself – which Kant
could not possibly concede.
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9 Reason, I say, takes many forms: some cannot be transcendental. Kant invents Vernunft
as the decisive “faculty of cognition,” but it fails utterly. All of Kant’s transcendental
specimens fail. I remind you that there are no assuredly confirmed (or confirmable)
synthetic  a  priori truths,  exceptionlessly  universal  laws  of  nature,  or  apodicticities.
Reason, in the form of Vernunft, cannot be more than a fiction – specifically, a fictive
cognitive faculty. The trouble is, Kant has no criterially pertinent account of the signs
of cognitive realism – or of any Idealist construction of an enabling realism – unless its
sheer presence and self-evident adequacy cannot be contested. But that can’t be good
enough. (I’ll come shortly to an empirical – in fact, a pragmatist – alternative.) For the
moment  I offer  the  enabling  distinction  between a  would-be  Rationalist  faculty (the
transcendental  faculty  of  cognition)  and  mundane  (empirical  or sensory)  reasoning
(already introduced) as a distinct functionality of mind that, commonly entwined with
what is sensorily “given” in what we (and Kant) call experience, is already capable of
focusing something of the significance of what is thus given. (The argument applies to
animals  and  human  infants  as  well,  though  they  lack  language  and  discursive
concepts.)  Kant’s  facultative  claim  defeats  itself,  then,  if  indeed  there  are  no
demonstrable  fixities  of  the  sorts  Kant  imagines.  (A  Kantian  faculty  seems  to  be
inherently transcendental, whereas ordinary reasoning is simply a contingent mode of
the mind’s functioning – with no particular privilege regarding knowledge of the actual
world.) My treatment of the distinction between “faculty” and “functionality” is little
more than a gloss on Reichenbach’s treatment of the matter (Reichenbach 1956: Part
One).  Still,  Kant  seems  to  take  it  for  granted  that  if  we  accept  his  transcendental
premise, the realism issue will have been settled!
10 Now,  the  sparest  empiricist  –  in  fact,  an  important  element  in  the  pragmatist  –
conception  of  empirical  knowledge  provides  an  extremely  plausible  approach  to
cognitive realism, without any abstruse enabling machinery from the would-be “faculty
of Reason.” It’s perfectly reasonable to separate the would-be transcendental powers of
the faculty of Reason (Vernunft) from the empirical or instrumental functionalities of the
mind that, even in the unlanguaged animal world, can be strengthened and improved.
It’s only that I deem transcendental Vernunft to be entirely fictional or arbitrary and
indemonstrable.  Advanced animals lack the discursive concepts of cognitive realism
and the ability to report  their  inner mental  states –  hence they have no conscious
awareness of their own facultative powers. But then, in Kant’s apparent commitment,
they could not survive if  they required the powers of transcendental Reason. (Kant
cannot, then, accommodate animal intelligence without a radical change of theory.)
11 There is a distinctive perceptual or experiential “duality” that runs through human and
much  of  animal  experience  (along  promisingly  cognate  lines),  that  seems  all  but
assuredly  linked to  an effective  realism,  conscious  or  not.  I  mean the  spontaneous
(“given”) “appearings-of-the-world-to-us” and the cognate “appeareds” (macroscopic
objects, say) that tend to “appear” reliably and recurrently among our interpretively
transient “appearings.” These are hardly contrived! It’s reasonable to suppose that the
executive  brain  embeds  this  automatic  advantage  (by  nonconscious  means)  in  our
perceptions, so that we need not stray too far to be realistically (but no more than
approximatively)  oriented  empirically.  Pragmatism  itself  is,  quite  laxly,
“instrumentalist,” open-ended, incompletable – though seemingly adequately revisable
(where needed) for ordinary life. In a word, Kant misrepresents the realism of animal
and human life. It’s the enabling structures and processes of the sensory modalities
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(sight and hearing, preeminently, functioning through the eyes and ears) that justify
the assumption of their being “faculties of cognition” – not Vernunft, which produces no
suitably parallel duality. If we confine ourselves to empirical resources, then I should
say the perceptual modalities are indeed the only true faculties of cognition (among
animals  and  humans,  alike),  although  they  cannot  service  transcendental powers.
Among  humans,  they  service  only  the  unassuming  mundanities  of  a  makeshift
pragmatism – which accommodate whatever precision or changes of conviction the
human race requires. The argument actually seems to have located a mortal weakness
in Kant’s Critique that I’ve been seeking: our ignorance of the mental life of animals. But
it also savages the whole of transcendentalism. Is that acceptable? 
12 I  should perhaps add that First  Philosophy is,  in good part,  a  matter of  conceptual
fashion. I  have been attracted by what may be called an “imaginary,” the would-be
single pendulum swing from Parmenides to pragmatism, a sweep from fixity to flux –
so that the weakness of Kant’s entire vernünftig undertaking will have been rendered
vulnerable  as  a  consequence  of  the  accumulating  failures  of  Rationalism  and
transcendentalism. Of course, Kant has had his inning: there are no ontic or epistemic




13 I  trust  it’s  clear  that,  admitting Kant’s  immense importance and influence  and the
ineliminable petitios of First Philosophy, a viable empiricism pretty well requires the
defeat  of  Kant’s  transcendentalism.  Realism,  the  cognizability  of  the  actual  world,
cannot be a negligible matter; but neither can it be more than a dependent conjecture.
That’s  to  say,  from  the  pragmatist  point  of  view,  it’s  not  necessary  (in  fact,  it’s
impossible) to prove – beyond a reasonable uncertainty – that we assuredly satisfy the
conditions of objective cognition. Of course, we do not, but then we need not. In fact,
I’m prepared to say, borrowing John Dewey’s well-known and well-conceived epistemic
compromise (“warranted assertibility”),  that we are able to reduce doubt about the
objectivity of our cognitive beliefs without actually attempting to reach indubitable
truth; or, indeed, by electing a Peircean “abduction,” which, in my opinion, converges
satisfactorily with Dewey’s sensible qualification. Empirically, then, the sum total of the
perceptual conditions of realism cannot be completely satisfied: they cannot even be
completely known. Kant, of course, cannot accept any such lacuna. But he neglects the
existential  role of  history (hence,  also,  a  perfectly benign skepticism – the mate of
whatever we take to be the source of empirical knowledge) and the evolution of novel
experiential episodes. In this sense, the defeat of Kant’s transcendental Reason, or the
provision of  a  Peircean “abduction,”  yields  a  second gain:  a  gathering sense of  the
instrumental aptness of an incomplete set of the enabling conditions of realism among
our mundane concerns. We proceed (empirically), by corrective guesses and a sense of
approximative adequacy: that is, realism remains conjectural, but revisable in sensory
ways.
14 I  see in this  the incipient endorsement of  another important empirically conceived
liberty: namely, the apt analysis, appreciation and interpretation of the enlanguaged
artifacts of the human world. Here, the connective – “civilizational” – process rests
with its ethos more than its logic, though it cannot fail to apply its cognitive resources
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supportively. It seeks to penetrate the holist “meaning” and significance of human life
– again, constantly evolving, continually novel, but incompleteable nonetheless. It’s an
extraordinary fact, but true enough, that Darwin utterly fails to examine the (thus far)
final, most important, completely unique phase of human evolution – the invention and
mastery of natural language (and its accompanying cultures) and the significance of the
radical change in evolution itself; the appearance of a hybridized process that entwines
biochemical and enlanguaged cultural forces in accounting for the self-transformation
of  primate  into  self  or  person.  The  linkage  is  a  loose  one,  but  firm  enough  –  the
collective effort of humanity to understand the evolving nature and behavior of actual
human life. The holism of the effort draws very naturally from the remarkable feat of
sharing  a  public  language  –  incorporating  even  the  complex  forms  of  serial
bilingualism or pluralism, globally extended. This is the common space of human labor
and liberty: the creation, production, enactment, and expression of all that belongs to
civilizational life. But then the discursive is itself a thoroughly dependent innovation.
15 All  that  relates  to  enlangauged  cultural  artifacts,  I  say,  has  a  distinctive  kind  of
meaning,  significance,  signification,  semiotic  import,  or  the  like,  which  I  call
“Intentionality”  (written  with  capital  “I”).  Its  characteristic  analysis  I  call
“interpretation,”  the  detection  or  inventive  construal  of  its  discursive  meaning  or
significance.  The  mode  of  understanding  Intentionality  is  basically  empirically
imaginative  rather  than  assuredly  cognitive  in  the  rationalist  sense  mentioned  in
section I; although interpreting societies tend to adopt (what I call) a sittlich norm or
norms  of  meaning  and  significance  (plausible  beliefs)  characteristically  less  than
objective  truth  –  but  no  longer  partitioned  (“compartmentalized,”  to  use  Dewey’s
derogatory term), however restricted to something akin to “warranted assertibility” –
which reaches to an acceptable measure of trustworthy belief but not to confirmably
fixed or apodictic truth.  There you have the civilizational (or geistlich)  sense of  the
pragmatist “aesthetic,” which provides for the unrestricted (pluralistic) interplay of
appreciative  and  interpretive  concepts,  now  engaging  the  “imaginary”  holism  of  a
civilization or historied Lebensform.
16 I’m afraid I regard Kant’s treatment of the aesthetic judgment of beauty (in the third
Critique) a complete disaster. But, in assigning a good part of the aesthetic use of the
“Intentional”  to  the  imagination,  I  mean  to  signify  that  Intentional  interpretation
applies, discursively, to any and every pertinently enlanguaged space, “civilizationally”
–  that  is,  integrally,  collectively,  overlappingly,  consensually  –  to  engage  politics,
morality, religion, medicine, education, sports, manufacture, the law, the arts, practical
life. It’s a well-known commonplace that the interpretation of modern painting cannot
be  productively  “compartmentalized”  (Dewey’s  term)  as  strictly  autonomous
disciplines or idioms, as between the aesthetic and the political. Every viable predicable
acquires  affinities  (both  lax  and  strict)  across  the  entire  unity  that  is  a  society’s
collective life (see, for instance, de Duve 2018: 97-8).
17 One  of  the  cleverest,  certainly  one  of  the  most  celebrated  (and  often  demoted)
exemplars of the mutual dependence of the aesthetic and the political in the multi-
faceted revolution against the Beaux Arts System in mid-nineteenth-century France is
still Manet’s “Luncheon on the Grass” (1863) (see Bourdieu 2017). De Duve makes the
interesting suggestion (in Kant’s behalf, in the third Critique) that “The only true art
would be the art of living. The good and the beautiful would [then] be one” (Kant 1999:
97) – though de Duve rightly warns us that these two predicables are not the same. This
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catches  up  the  import  of  the  phrasing,  “le  sens  de  la  famille,”  which  is  meant
(metaphorically) to explain Kant’s view of mankind as an extended family. If we read
this  literally,  then  it  accords  as  well  with  the  sense  in,  say,  Abraham  Lincoln’s
Emancipation  Proclamation  (which  appeared  about  the  time  of  Manet’s  painting),
which  could  also  count  as  both  an  aesthetic  gesture and  an  unexpected  political
commitment  (one  can  almost  imagine  Lincoln  murmuring  to  himself:  “Beautiful,”
which  is  to  say,  opposing  Kant,  that  a  discursive  explanation  would  be  entirely
welcome). But just as this connection occurred to me, Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Putin’s
best-known political  critic,  returned to  Russia  from his  German hospital  (where he
recovered from a near-fatal poisoning) to surrender to the Russian authorities. I would
say that that was similarly brilliant, courageous, and thoroughly beautiful,  though I
would  not  think,  in  saying  so,  that  I  was  “entitled”  (in  Kant’s  sense)  to  count  on
universal accord. Intentional interpretation is hospitable, for entirely different reasons,
to both relativistic and pluralistic forms of holism.
18 The  failure  of  the  archic  (the  transcendental,  say)  in  the  natural  world  –  in  First
Philosophy, enlanguaged human space – may be the single most decisive philosophical
discovery  that  may  be  claimed,  in  favoring  the  primacy  of  pragmatism’s  empirical
resources over Kant’s arbitrary transcendentalism. There are, as I say, no synthetic a
priori necessary truths, no apodicticities. Hence, Reason (Vernunft) cannot be a cognitive
faculty, in any sense that rivals the rightful claims of sensory perception (to include,
integrally, animal forms of inference or induction or the like). As I’ve argued, sensory
perception and experience appear to include a variety of elementary forms of thinking
or “reasoning” (functionalities of mind, let us say) that make it possible for the higher
languageless animals to be intelligent – to learn from experience, for instance. It’s the
continuum  of  the  animal  and  the  human  in  this  regard  that  Darwinian  evolution
vouchsafes (that Kant all but neglects), although it’s also true that Darwin fails to grasp
the  cultural  marvel  of  discursive  understanding.  But  what  is  Kant  without  the
transcendental? Nothing but “a somewhat confused pragmatist,” Peirce affirms! (See
Collected  Papers,  5.525).  Kant’s  theory  of  the  sensory  as  completely  passive  and
“unthinking” is entirely off the mark. It’s surely inappropriate to posit, as one’s most
important  cognitive  source,  a  would-be faculty  that  cannot  be  straightforwardly
confirmed. 
19 Apart from the formal sciences, truth, among pragmatists, is never quite secure: Dewey
favors reasonable belief over questionably assured truth, or perhaps, confirmation is
itself somewhat honorific – effectively, a risked conjecture. This is the sense in which
Peircean “abduction” and Deweyan “warranted assertibility” merge or converge as a
shared form of  improvisational  confidence  about  the  provisional  adequacy  of  what
Dewey  names  “instrumentalism,”  a  would-be  felicitous  guess  at  what  serves  our
practical  needs  and  interests  for  the  occasion:  ultimately,  a  form  of  “learned
ignorance” on the part of savvy investigators likely to bring us close to an enabling
belief short of assured truth.
20 If we press the point, pragmatism will be viewed as decidedly free-wheeling: erroneous
conjectures may even, on occasion, be more rewarding than mundane truisms. In any
case, they will be continually replaced. There is no science of science to gainsay the
practice.  It’s  in  this  sense  that  I  view  Nancy Cartwright’s  and  Ian  Hacking’s
experimental  methods  as  somewhat  akin  to  a  Peircean  abduction  or  a  deliberate
reversal  of  the  standard  unity-of-science  policy.  In  any  active  discipline  –  politics,
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medicine, education – history and actual discovery affect our future methodological
guesses.  It’s  the holism of  a  collective society or culture or Lebensform or  linguistic
practice  that  takes  command:  the  “compartmentalization”  of  historied  disciplines
collapses; there is no assured disjunction, say, between the articulation of the aesthetic
and the political. Interpretation tests its own disposition; we find ourselves confronted
by the rush of new objects, new data, new linkages, new meanings involving the human
world.  At  the  very  least,  these  events  seek  a  new (approximative)  “sittlich”  site  of
societal  life,  as  they  evolve;  Kant’s  aesthetic  “entitlement”  to  universal  agreement
regarding  beauty  becomes  utterly  pointless.  The  new  “rule”  is  ouverture,  the
democratization of taste – as hospitable to banalities as to high art. And yet, I find a
distinction of considerable importance to be salvaged here, that begins to find its own
double nascent in creativity and mundane praxis, the very poles of human agency. I’m
referring once again (obliquely) to the “duality” of “appearings” and “objects” that
“appear”  in  such  “appearings.”  I  suggest  that  every  responsible  cognitive  realism
requires such a duality – in order (at the very least) to distinguish the apparent and the
actual. (I claim, of course, that Kant fails us here.) Duality affords the best clue I can
think of that provides a structural sense of how to approach the realism issue; and, of
course, it clearly favors some form of empiricism or pragmatism. It also makes sense of
the Darwinian continuum and the intelligence of animals, which rationalism usually
fails to address.
21 I’ve distinguished lightly between Franz Brentano’s treatment of the “intentional” and
my own conception of “Intentionality,” which favors different senses of “aboutness”
(cf. Margolis 1995). Brentano favors a narrowly defined mentalistic puzzle. I  frankly
pirate the term to mark the search for the approximative (referential) aboutness of the
sittlich site of any enlanguaged or language-bound utterance that invites or requires
interpretation  in  a  culturally  requisite  sense:  that’s  to  say,  an  Intentional
interpretation of the import or significance (the semiotic “aboutness” – if you wish) of
what one deems to be “intended” by one’s choice of a suitable sittlich site. For instance,
Wordsworth’s  well-known  Lucy  poem,  which  grieves  over  the  death  of  the  poet’s
beloved, is not inaptly thought to be centered on the import of a dehumanized physics.
In that sense, my use of “intentional” searches for those parts of the would-be sittlich
core  of  the  life  of  a  collective  society  and  its  perceived  spirit,  which  centers  the
intended or completed utterance perspicuously. Brentano’s “intentional” tends to be
broadly  referential.  But  then,  ideally,  the  “Intentional”  (with  capital  “I”)  offers  a
creative interpretation of (about) what the “intentional” (in my contrived sense) takes
the  utterance  to  be  about,  referentially.  Ineluctably,  the  interpretation  affects  the
meaning of the sittlich core. I intend this formulation as the merest makeshift, to afford
a  reasonable  sense  of  legible  order  under  minimal  (largely  improvisational,
experimental)  constraints.  In  that  sense,  Intentionality  favors  both  pluralism  and
relativism. 
22 I remind you that there is no art or politics without language; no history or morality or
normativity or objects that manifest interpretable meaning. All of these distinctions
are thoroughly artifactual: they have no cognate sources in mere physical nature. They
escape  sheer  arbitrariness,  however,  by  the  iterability  of  artifactual  differences.  In
Kant, in the Opus postumum, they already take the form of imperatives – which is to say,
they appear as discoveries or revelations of archic power! Of course, they were already
thus approached by Hammurabi. The arts and politics collect the births and deaths of
all such transformations, Intentionally; and, thus conceptually prepared, we turn from
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one would-be sittlich station to another. Historied consensus collects these judgments
in an acceptable narrative.  Almost no one now dwells  on the sun’s mortality!  Thus
construed, Intentionality is no less than the most ineliminable part of the species’ need
to  understand  itself.  We  lack  a  natural  or  essential  telos.  But  we  have  an  endless
appetite for surrogates of our own invention, which is never quite adequately appeased
but which defines our purpose. The only alternative (perhaps) is to anticipate another
meteor to clear the planet for other species, other races. Intentionality is little more
than  mortality  focused  in  distraction.  The  argument  spills  over  into  the  study  of
physical nature itself, but now under the executive questions of human possibilities –
which we have yet to capture. Perhaps a threat from outer space would…?
23 I leave the matter unresolved: it’s unresolvable. It’s the endless innovation of the future
that we must heed: it replaces every presumptive telos, as we survive. In that obvious
sense,  we  come  to  understand  the  diverse  and  changeable  unity  of  the  human
narrative. That’s to say, its fearsome and contingent mystery.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper develops a criticism of Kant’s transcendentalism, claiming that his idea of reason fails
to take into account the Darwinian continuum linking higher mammals and human primates. At
the same time, Kant’s ontology and epistemology fail to consider the fact that humans are the
product  of  the  contingent  yet  irreversible  linguistic,  cultural,  and  Intentional  (written  with
capital  “I”)  configuration  of  their  form  of  life.  The  author  favors  pragmatism  as  a  viable
alternative,  and draws  upon John Dewey’s  epistemic  compromise  (“warranted  assertibility”),
suggesting  that  we  can  reduce  doubt  about  the  objectivity  of  our  cognitive  beliefs  without
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actually attempting to reach indubitable truth. On these grounds, the paper argues against the
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